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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintitf-Appellant,

Case No. 860342-CA

v.
Category No. 2

CURTIS OWENS,
Defendant-Respondent.:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PRPCEEPJNS5
This appeal is from the trial court's order arresting
judgment and granting a new trial to defendant after a jury had
convicted defendant in the Fourth Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN,
S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah R. Crim. P. 26(c)(2) (UTAH CODE
ANN. S 77-35-26(0(2) (1982)).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor's
pretrial warning to a defense witness concerning possible
criminal liability constituted grounds for arresting judgment and
granting defendant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Curtis Owens, was charged with theft under a
rental agreement pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-404 and -410
(1978) (R. 26). After a jury found defendant guilty of the
charged offense, the trial court, upon defendant's motion,
arrested judgment and ordered a new trial (R. 61, 116-22).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Crim. P. 23:
At any time prior to the imposition ot
sentence, the court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion ot a defendant shall,
arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense,
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is
other good cause for the arrest of judgment.
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless
a judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached,
order a commitment until the defendant is
charged anew or retried, or may enter any
other order as may be just and proper under
the circumstances.
Utah R. Crim. P. 24:
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party
or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made
in writing and upon notice. The motion shall
be accompanied by attidavits or evidence of
the essential facts in support of the motion.
If additional time is required to procure
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone
the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made
within 10 days after imposition of sentence,
or within such further time as the court may
fix during the ten day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party
shall be in the same position as if no trial
had been held and the former verdict shall
not be used or mentioned either in evidence
or in argument.
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(c):
(c) An appeal may be taken by the
prosecutor:
(1) From a final judgment of
dismissal;
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(2) From an order arresting

judgment;

(3) From an order terminating the
prosecution because ot a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(4) From a judgment of the court
holding a statute or any part thereof invalid;
or
(5) From an order of the court
granting a pre-trial motion to suppress
evidence when, upon a petition for review, the
supreme court decides that such an appeal
would be in the interest of justice*

standard 3-3.2(b), A.B.fl, standards for Criming!
Justice:
Whenever a prosecutor knows or has reason
to believe tnat the conauct of a witness to
be interviewed may be the subject ot a
criminal prosecution, the prosecutor or the
prosecutor's investigator should advise the
witness concerning possible self-incrimination and the possible need for counsel.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 29, 1986, defendant entered

into a rental

agreement for a television set with the Curtis Mathes outlet in
Orem, Utah.

That agreement called for monthly installments of

thirty-two dollars and contained a clause that allowed
to terminate the agreement upon proper notice.
1986,

defenaant

In early October

having not received the September payment on the television

from defendant, Curtis Mathes attempted
only to discover

to contact defendant,

that he had moved and apparently taken the

television with him.

On October 16, Curtis Mathes turned the
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matter over to the Orem Police Department.

Affidavit of Steve

Wright (R. 92-93). X
According to defendant, in September 1986 he gave
Lawrence Hamilton, his roommate, sixty-five dollars to pay to
Curtis Mathes for the September and October 1986 installments on
the television rental contract*

Defendant stated that he never

told Hamilton the money was for a phone bill and that he neither
owed Hamilton money nor told him the sixty-tive dollars was
payment for such a debt.

Affidavit of Curtis Owens (R. 89).

During conversations with defendant's attorneys prior
to trial, Hamilton acknowledged that he had received sixty-five
dollars from defendant for payment to Curtis Mathes on the
television rental contract, but that he did not give the money to
the store and instead used it for his own purposes.

Hamilton

indicated that he would testify accordingly at defendant's trial.
Attidavit of James P. Rupper (R. 111-12); Atfidavit of Collin
Winchester (R. 113) .
At trial, Hamilton gave the following pertinent
testimony on direct examination by defendants attorney:
Q:

Do you know the defendant, Curtis Owens?

1

This brief's statement of facts is derived primarily from the
artidavits attached to defendant's post-trial motion and the
response to it filed by the State. The trial court relied
heavily on those atfidavits in rendering its decision to arrest
judgment and to grant defendant a new trial.
Although Mr. Wright, a co-owner of the Curtis Mathes store,
gave additional testimony in his affidavit concerning defendant's
efforts to rectify the problem with his bill (R. 42-43), tnat
evidence apparently was not presented at trial and is not
critical to this appeal. gee Memorandum of Defendant (R. 83-84);
Memorandum ot State (R. 97-98) .
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Yes,

I do.

When did you f i r s t meet Mr. Owens?
I met C u r t i s about tnree y e a r s ago.
And was there a time when you were
[ C l u r t i s ' s roommate?
Yes,

there was.

When did that occur?
The first time was in June of 1984 when
we resided in the Continental Apartments.
And again at the Seville Apartments from
August to about early October.
Of what year?
Of 1986.
While you were residing in the Seville
apartments with Curtis as your roomraatef
do you recall a color television—a
Curtis-Mathes Color Television being in
the apartment?
Yes, I do.
Who brought that television into the
apartment?
Curtis did.
Did he tell you that he was leasing the
TV? Did he tell you that he owned the
TV?
He told me that he was renting it from
Curtis-Mathes, yes.
Did Curtis ever leave town for a while
while you were his roommate?
Yes, he did.
Do you know approximately when t h a t was?
No, I d o n ' t .
Prior to his leaving town, did he give
you any money?
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Yes, he did.
Do you know the amount thereof?
Somewhere between forty-five and sixty
dollars, somewhere therein.
Did he give you any instructions as to
what to do with that money?
Some money was what he owed me, and I was
supposed to pay a bill for it with the
money that he gave me, yes.
Did he tell you which bill you were
supposed to pay with the money?
Not specifically. I remember we did have
a phone bill that had to be paid, though.
Did you, in fact, pay that phone bill?
No, I didn't.
What did you do with the money?
I took the money and kept it because most
of it was owed to me.
Did Curtis ever tell you, "Hey, this is
the money I owe you?"
He just asked me about the bill, and that
was it. And I asked him which one.
Did he give you any indication that you
were free to spend that money?
Well, I was under the assumption that
since he owed me a majority of it, I was
free to do so.
Did Curtis tell you it was okay to spend
it and not pay it on the loan?
No, he didn't.

Did you ever pay Curtis-Mathes anything
on the money Curtis owed them?
No, I didn't. I never knew anything
about Curtis-Mathes as far as a bill
being concerned. He may have brought it
up tnat he owed money to them, but not
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that I was supposed to specifically pay a
bill to Curtis-Mathes.
Q:

How long were you Mr. Owen's [rJooramate?

A:

For approximately two months.

Q:

Which one of you moved out?

A:

He moved out before I did.

Q:

And [at] that time did he take the
television with him?

A:

The television—if I remember correctly,
the television was still in the
apartment. I can't recall for sure what
happened to it.

Q:

You don't know whether he took it with
him?

A:

Nof because he left two days before I did
and he still had stutf in the apartment.

(T. 2-5) . 2
However, in his post-trial affidavit, Hamilton stated:
1. I gave testimony at the trial of
Curtis Owens on April 28, 1987. I feel I was
deterred in giving my complete knowledge of
the facts of this matter because of
intimidating remarks made to me by the
prosecution prior to trial and because
Curtis'[s] lawyer did not ask me more
specific questions regarding my knowledge ot
these events.
2. On either April 23 or 24, 1987 upon my
arriving home from work, I found a message
for me taken by a roommate which instructed
me to call Snerry Ragan at the Utah County
Attorneys Office at 373-0136.
3. I dialed this number and after
identifying myself to the individual who
answered, I stated I was returning Sherry
Ragan's call.
"T." reters to the partial transcript of the trial that has
been filed on appeal.
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4. An individual then came on the phone
and identified herself as Sherry Ragan and
thanked me for returning her call.
5. She stated tnat she was calling about
the Curtis Owens matter and then asked me[ # ]
"Did Curtis Owens give you money for the
Curtis Math[e]s bill?"
6. Before I could answer the question,
she followed it up with "and if he did and
you didn't pay the bill, you can be cnarged
with theft."
7. I asked what she meant by I could be
charged with theft?
8. She replied if Owens gave me money
specitically for the Curtis Mathtels bill and
I didn't use the money for that purpose, that
is theft.
9. A theft charge was the last sort of
problem I needed.
10. Curtis Owens gave me $60 to $65
sometime during September, 1986, which was on
the day Curtis left on a trip for Idaho.
11. I knew about the Curtis[-]Mathes bill
and a phone bill owed by Curtis as we were
roommates.
12. On the morning ot the day Curtis gave
me the money, we talked about these bills as
well as the fact that Curtis owed me $45.
13. When Curtis gave me the money, I
vaguely remember him stating sometning to the
effect "this is for the bill."
14. It is very possible Curtis may have
said this is for the Curtis Math[e]s bill or
whatever but frankly I was very busy that
day[;] Curtis at times was very dirticult to
understand because ot his speech impediment
and I may not have been paying much attention
to what he was saying.
15. I applied $45 of the money towards
what Curtis owed me.
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16. At the trial Curtis Owens'Is] lawyer
never asked me questions that would have
allowed me to fully explain this matter and
as I have already stated, I was fearful
because of the prosecution*s statements
towards me.
(R. 8 6 - 8 8 ) .

In her p o s t - t r i a l

affidavit,

the p r o s e c u t o r .

Ragan, s e a t e d :

2.
On or about April 2 3 , 1987, I spoke
with a person who i d e n t i f i e d himself as
Lawrence Hamilton by phone.
3 . Mr. Hamilton had returned my c a l l
h i s apartment e a r l i e r the same day.

to

4.
At the time I spoke to Mr. Hamilton I
had been informed t h a t Mr. Hamilton was to be
a w i t n e s s in the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d matter which
was scheduled for t r i a l on April 2 8 , 1987.
5. I had further been informed by
Defendant's attorney that Mr. Hamilton's
testimony would be different than his
previous statements to the complaining
witness, Ralph Wright.
6. When I spoke to Mr. Hamilton he very
emphatically told me that Curtis Owens had
owed him money and that money was owed on
several bills including the rent, phone bill
and utilities.
7. I told Mr. Hamilton that I had been
told tnat he was going to say that Curtis
Owens had given him the money, $65.00, for
specific purpose of taking the money to
Curtis Math[e]s to pay that bill and that
after receiving the money he decided to not
pay Curtis's bill but to use the money for
his own use. (Curtis Owens!fs] testimony at
preliminary hearing dated January 20, 1987.)
I told Mr. Hamilton that if this was his
testimony he would be admitting to thett and
tnat he might want to talk to an attorney
before he testified.
8. Mr. Hamilton was very quick to assure
me that he did not know anything about the
Curtis Math[e]s bill, just as he had told
-9-

Sherry

Ralph Wright [co-owner of the Curtis Mathes
outlet in Orem] and tnat the money was given
to him to pay on bills and to pay him what
Curtis owed him.
9. After speaking to Mr. Hamilton I told
the Defendant's attorney of my conversation
with Mr. Hamilton.
10. It was not my intention to try to
intluence Mr. Hamilton's testimony but to
find out what his testimony would be and to
caution him, if necessary, of the possible
implications ot his testimony.
11. Mr. Hamilton was very anxious to tell
me that he had no knowledge of the television
or the money. I did not have the impression
that he was telling what he said because of
any intimidation he felt from me.
1 2 . Mr. Hamilton's testimony at t r i a l on
d i r e c t examination was very similar to what
he had t o l d me on the phone and to what he
had p r e v i o u s l y t o l d Ralph Wright.
(R. 1 0 1 - 0 2 ) .
After the jury returned a verdict ot guilty as charged
(R. 61), defendant filed a motion titled "Motion For Arrest Of
Judgment Or In The Alternative For New Trial" (R. 78). In his
supporting memoranda, defendant argued, inter alia, that he
should receive a new trial because Hamilton, due to the
prosecutor's statements concerning possible criminal liability
for theft, had been intimidated into not giving the testimony at
trial tnat he had indicated he would to defendant's attorneys
prior to trial (R. 80-85, 103-09).

After a full hearing on the

matter, the trial court ruled that defendant was entitled to a
new trial because the prosecutor's pretrial warning to Hamilton
was improper and that it had a prejudicial intluence on
Hamilton's trial testimony (R. 116-22) (Addendum).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The warning of possible criminal liability given by the
prosecutor to a defense witness prior to trial was consistent
with Standard 3-3.2(b), A.B.A. Standards of Criminal Justice,
Therefore, the trial court erred in arresting judgment and
granting defendant a new trial.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ARRESTED JUDGMENT
AND GRANTED DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON
THE WARNING ABOUT POSSIBLE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
GIVEN TO A DEFENSE WITNESS BY THE PROSECUTOR
BEFORE TRIAL.
The issue presented in this appeal is a narrow one:
Did the trial court erroneously arrest judgment and grant
defendant a new trial based upon its conclusion that the
prosecutor was guilty of misconduct when she, prior to trial,
warned a defense witness, Lawrence Hamilton, that his anticipated
testimony might subject him to criminal liability?

However,

before addressing this issue, it is necessary to discuss briefly
the procedural avenue followed in presenting this appeal to this
Court.
In a criminal case, an appeal may be taken by the
prosecution only in certain circumstances, one of which is when
the trial court arrests judgment.

Utah R. Crim. P. 2b(c)(2)

(UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-26(c)(2) (1982)).

In the instant case,

defendant filed a motion which he captioned as one for arrest of
judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

Tnat motion

was filed and eventually ruled upon prior to any imposition of
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sentence.

Although in its ruling the trial court, after noting

that defendant's motion was captioned in the alternative, stated
that "the motion of the defendant for a new trial is well taken
and is therefore hereby granted" (R. 116; Addendum), it in
substance arrested judgment under Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (UTAH CODE
ANN. S 77-35-23 (1982)) and ordered that defendant be retried
under that rule.

This is so because Rule 23 is applicable to

post-trial motions like defendant's that are filed prior to the
imposition of sentence.

A true motion for a new trial is made

pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-24
(1982)) atter the imposition of sentence.

See Rule 24(c).

Therefore, the State is properly before this Court pursuant to

Rule 2 6 ( c ) ( 2 ) on an appeal from the lower c o u r t ' s a r r e s t of
judgment under Rule 23.
The trial court's ruling was based squarely on the
conclusion that the prosecutor improperly warned Lawrence
Hamilton that, if he testified to converting to his own use the
money given him by defendant for payment to Curtis Mathes on the
television rental contract, he might be liable for thett.

In

making its ruling, the court clearly accepted paragraph 7 of the
prosecutor's affidavit as fact (R. 117-19).

That paragraph

states:
I told Mr.Hamilton that I had been told
tnat he was going to say that Curtis Owens
had given him tne money, $65.00, for the
specific purpose of taking the money to
Curtis Mathlejs to pay that bill and that
after receiving the money he decided to not
pay Curtis's bill but to use the money for
his own use. (Curtis Owensl's] testimony at
preliminary hearing dated January 20, 1987.)
I told Mr. Hamilton that if this was his
-12-

testimony he would be admitting to thett and
tnat he might want to talk to an attorney
before he testified.
(R. 102). Based on this evidence, the court determined that "the
actions of the prosecutor were improper in that it [sic] deprived
the defendant of his right to have his defense presented by
testimony of witnesses that would be given freely and without
fear of prosecution for the testimony given" (R. 121).

In doing

so, it rejected the prosecutor's argument tnat her warning to
Hamilton complied with Standard 3-3.2(b) , ABA Standards for
Criminal Just!??, which provides:
Whenever a prosecutor knows or has reason
to believe that the conduct of a witness to
be interviewed may be the subject of a
criminal prosecution, the prosecutor or the
prosecutor's investigator should advise the
witness concerning possible self-incrimination and the possible need for counsel.
The court stated:
The above standard [3-3.2(b)] appears to be
postured in respect to witnesses contacted by
the State in the course of investigating a
matter when the conduct of a prospective
witness "may be the subject of a criminal
prosecution", is prior to the filing of a
charge a [sic] preliminary hearing or
indictment and would not apply to this case
since the advise [sic] was just a few days
prior to trial. At this particular juncture
coming from the prosecution, the cases cited
by counsel for tfce defendant are definitive
as to the impropriety of that conduct. The

cases of State Vt Peterson* 722 p.2d 768
(Utah, 1986), United States v. Morrison, 535
F.2d 223 (3rd Cir. 1976), United States v.
MacClosKy. 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 198^),

United States v. Smith* 478 F.2d 976 ( D . C .
Cir. 1973) would support the findings of the
court that the conduct of the prosecutor in
the assertions as set forth in paragraph 7 of
her attidavit are impermissible and tnat the
error is not harmless but in fact could have
had a strong intluence on the verdict
-13-

rendered by the jury where had the testimony
of Hamilton been given as it had been
determined prior to the phone call the jury
may have very well concluded that the
defendant had no intent to steal services
under the rental agreement but in fact had
made arrangements that the bill be paid and
that the decision of the witness Hamilton not
to pay the rental bill but to pay what he
claimed defendant owed him was the reason the
bill went unpaid.
(R. 121-122; Addendum).
Although the p r o s e c u t o r ' s warning may have
Hamilton's t r i a l
case.
1986).

testimony,

that f a c t i s not f a t a l

influenced

t o the S t a t e ' s

Holbert v . United S t a t e s . 513 A.2d 825, 82b-28 (D.C. App.
The warning given was in l i n e with Standards

3-3.2(b),

unaer which the prosecutor had an e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n to inform
Hamilton of p o s s i b l e criminal l i a b i l i t y

through

self-

i n c r i m i n a t i o n and t o a d v i s e him of the p o s s i b l e need for
Id.» at 827.

The h i s t o r y of Standard 3 - 3 . 2 ( b )

counsel.

makes t h i s

clear:

In the first edition, paragraph (b) stated
that "it is proper but not mandatory" for a
prosecutor to advise a witness of the
privilege against self-incrimination and the
possible need for counsel when there is
reason to believe the witness may be
subjected to criminal prosecution. This has
been changed to provide tnat a prosecutor
should give such advisements whenever
criminal prosecution of the witness is
considered possible.
I ABA Standards for Criminal Justice S 3-3.2, at 41-42 (2d ed.
Supp. 1986).

The commentary to 3-3.2(b) further explains:

Prosecutors and their investigators
obviously should warn witnesses of the right
to a lawyer and to remain silent if the
circumstances of the questioning constitute
custodial interrogation. Paragraph (b) deals
with situations where custodial interrogation
is not present. However, prosecutors and
their investigators cannot conceal
-14-

information concerning law violations that
come to their attention. Essentially, they
occupy a position like that of police
otficers, but without custody of witnesses:
inadvertent disclosures may be admitted
against witnesses, should they later be
charged. Given the difficulty ot predicting
the course of future judicial action, and in
fairness to the person interviewed, it is
recommended that prosecutors and their
investigators warn potential defendants of
the privilege against self-incrimination and
the possible need for counsel.
i£., at 42.

And even though the prosecutorfs warning did not

pertectly track the language of $ 3-3.2(b), it adequately
communicated the essence of the standard.

Significantly, the

Utah Supreme Court has relied on the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice for guidance in deciding the appropriateness of
particular conduct in criminal proceedings.

See.

e.g.# State v.

RJChflldS/ 740 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1987); State v. Kav, 717 P.2d
1294, 1300-01 (Utah 1986); Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 345
(Utah 1980).
The trial court's conclusion that § 3-3.2(b) did not
apply to a prosecutor interviewing a witness after the filing of a
charge and shortly before trial simply is not supported by a plain
reading ot the standard.

A reasonable reading of § 3-3.2(b)

indicates that it applies to all stages of the criminal process,
including the trial stage.

Holbert, 513 A.2d at 827.

Furthermore,

United States v. Morrison. 535 F.2d 223 (3rd. Cir. 1976), and
United States v. Smith. 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973)—cases cited
by tne trial court to support its decision—are distinguishable
from the instant case, in that they plainly involved a tnreat of
prosecution whicn was calculated to make the potential defense
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witness an unwilling witness*

Admittedly, United States v.

MacCloskey. 682 F.2d 468, 479 (4th Cir. 1982), provides stronger
support for the court's ruling; however, given the "eleventh hour"
timing of the prosecutor's warning and the context in which it was
given, it carried an implicit threat of prosecution which appeared
to be intended to cause the witness to refrain from testifying.

In

defendant's case, the prosecutor's warning was given in the context
of investigating a defense witness's anticipated testimony and was
not, as testified to by the prosecutor, intended to influence or
intimidate the witness.

The warning was clearly offered in an

effort to comply with Standard 3-3.2(b).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, the trial court's
order arresting judgment and granting a new trial should be
/]

reversed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

3

day of November,

1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
* ^ W ^
DAVID B. THOMPS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

Case Number

CR 87 31

)

vs.

)

CURTIS OWENS,

)

Defendant.

RULING

)
********

This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion
to Arrest Judgment

or for

a new trial.

Memorandum

have been

submitted by counsel on both sides, and the court granted oral
argument and after a consideration of the foregoing has concluded
that the motion of the defendant for a new trial is well taken
and is therefore hereby granted.
The principal error assigned to the State in presenting
this case has to do with a conversation between the prosecutor
and a witness who had agreed to testify for the defendant.
witness,

Lawrence

preliminary

Hamilton,

had

hearing by James Rupper

who by affidavit asserted

been

contacted

then counsel

after

This
the

for defendant

that he had talked to Hamilton about

him having received $65.00 from defendant to pay on the rental
account of the defendant

in issue in this case.

Hamilton told

Rupper that he had received the money to be applied on the rental
account but used it for other purposes and that Hamilton owed the

1

lib

defendant that amount of money.

Hamilton further indicated his

willingness to testify

in behalf of defendant Owens.

in court

This matter was staffed by the public defender's office
Rupper

is employed), and it was determined

(where

they would continue

representing Owens.

At a later date Owens secured the services

of another attorney

(Winchester) and asked the public defenders

to withdraw.
The newly engaged counsel Colin Winchester
affidavit

which

account

1987, was essentially

of

interviewing

Hamilton

filed his

on April

20,

the same as that of Rupper to the effect

that approximately $64.00 was received by him from defendant for
the purpose of paying the rental bill.
County Attorney Ragan on the same day.

Winchester

so advised

Winchester was present

when a subpoena was served upon Mr. Hamilton by a process server
on the 27th of April at which time Mr. Hamilton reported to him
that a Deputy Utah County Attorney prosecuting this case called
him and asked him about his testimony and told him he could be
criminally liable for theft if he accepted Owens* money and did
not apply it on the rental bill.
The affidavit of Sherry Ragan admits that on or about
April 23 she spoke with Lawrence Hamilton by phone advising him
that she had learned that he was to be a witness in the case for
Mr. Hamilton and
another

that his testimony

would be contrary

witness, Ralph Wright, claimed

he had

told

to what

him.

Ms.

Ragan at paragraph 7 of her affidavit states:
-I told Mr. Hamilton that I had been told that he
was going to say that Curtis Owens had given him the
money, $65.00, for the specific purpose of taking the
money to Curtis Mathis to pay that bill and that after

2

IV

receiving the money he decided to not pay Curtis' bill
but to use the money for his own use.
(Curtis Owens1
testimony at preliminary hearing dated January 20,
1987).
I told Mr. Hamilton that if this was his
testimony he would be admitting to theft and that he
might want to talk to an attorney before he testified."
The balance of the affidavit asserts Hamilton's denial
of any knowledge about a rental bill and merely that the money
given to him was to pay on bills defendant owed him.
At subparagraph 10 of the affidavit Ms. Raga^, asserts:
"It was not my intention to try to influence Mr.
Hamilton's testimony but to find out what his testimony
would be and to caution him, if necessary, of the
possible implications of his testimony."
The

various

affidavits

are

consistent

insofar

as

material to the issue of the knowledge of defense counsel of the
apparent recanting of the story previously told both Rupper and
to Winchester after the April 23rd phone call.

A transcript of

the trial testimony of the witness Hamilton discloses something
less than what the prosecutor claims was told her on April 23 in
the telephone conversation, and the testimony the defense claimed
had been established

prior

to the trial and shortly after the

preliminary hearing through interviews with Hamilton by defense
counsel.
A

number

of

decisions

in

the

federal

jurisdictions

indicate that any kind of prosecutorial

statements which would

constitute

free

testimony

an
by

interference
a

defendant

with

through

the
a

witness

presentation

of

would

to

amount

prosecutorial misconduct and in some jurisdictions without more
would require a remand for a new trial while others require that
a canvassing of the record to determine whether

the misconduct

was harmless error is required.

its

The court could find no direct precedent in the Utah
law on the precise conduct of counsel in this case as to whether
it constituted misconduct to state in the manner disclosed in
paragraph 7 of her affidavit that testimony proffered by the
defense to be given by Hamilton would raise a question of theft
and that he should seek counsel, and if so whether the same was
harmful, or whether the per se rule would apply.

The recent Utah

case of State of Utah v. Gregory J. Peterson, 37 Utah Adv. Rpts.
10 would indicate that the per se rule does not apply in Utah and
that if the actions of the prosecutor constitute misconduct, the
granting of a new trial would depend upon whether such error was
or was not harmless.
Judging by the tenor of the testimony actually given by
Hamilton at trial, it appears that he was skirting with both
sides statements such as, "When Curtis left town he left him
between $45 and $60M, and his statement that "Some of the money
was what he owed to me, and I was supposed to pay a bill for it
with the money that he gave me, yes.M

He did not remember

specifically what bill but that they did have a phone bill that
had to be paid.

He further stated that he didn't pay the phone

bill, but took most of the money because it was owed to him.

He

did not admit that Curtis told him that the money given to him
was what he owed him, and he stated

that he was under

the

assumption that he owed the majority of it to him and he was free
to take it.

However, the witness denied that Curtis told him it

was okay to spend the money and not to pay the loan.

Hamilton

testified that HHe may have brought it up that he owed money to

4

1

them (on the rental) but not that I was supposed to specifically
pay a bill to Curtis Mathis.M
The foregoing summary of statements made that seem to
be

a

compromise

affidavits.

between

It

is

the

two

noteworthy

positions
that

all

set
of

forth
the

in

the

foregoing

testimony, the only testimony of Hamilton at the trial came from
the

defense

examination

of

him,

and

that

the

State

declined

crossexamination.
Had
indicated

Hamilton

testified

he had stated

as

the

defense

to them was his testimony

attorneys
before

the

prosecutor interviewed him the jury would have had before it the
fact that $64.00, the amount left with Hamilton by the defendant
was the amount that was due on the rental agreement at the time
defendant left town and left the money with Hamilton and had the
jury believed that a direct instruction was given to Hamilton to
pay the amount owing on the rental bill, and Owens testimony that
he thought he was current at the time he returned when contacted
by the owner of the property before the charge was filed, the
jury could have concluded that there was no intent by defendant
to deprive the owner of his property.
There is no question but counsel for Mr. Owens at the
trial

in examing Mr. Hamilton should

prior

conversation

been

aware

of

what

have reminded

both with him and the attorney
prior

counsel

him of his
should

have

(Rupper) had developed

with

regard to Hamiltonfs statements and could have done a great deal
in bringing this theory of the case home to the jury.

5

U

The court concludes that the actions of the prosecutor
were improper in that it deprived the defendant of his right to
have his defense presented by testimony of witnesses that would
be given freely and without fear of prosecution for the testimony
given.
The State justifies the actions of the prosecutor and
claims complaince with Standard 3-3.2 of the ABA's standards for
criminal justice which at subparagraph (b) it states:
•'Whenever a prosecutor knows or has reason to
believe that the conduct of a witness to be interviewed
may be the subject of a criminal prosecution, the
prosecutor or the prosecutor's investigator should
advise the witness against possible self-incrimination
and possible need for counsel."
The above standard appears to be postured in respect to witnesses
contacted by the State in the course of investigating a matter
when the conduct of a prospective witness "may be the subject of
a criminal prosecution", is prior to the filing of a charge a
preliminary hearing or indictment and would not apply to this
case since the advise was just a few days prior to trial.

At

this particular juncture coming from the prosecution, the cases
cited

by counsel

for the defendant are definitive as to the

impropriety of that conduct.

The cases of State v. Peterson, 722

P.2d 768 (Utah, 1986), United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223
(3rd Cir. 1976), United States v. Macclosky, 682 F.2d 468 (4th
Cir. 1982), United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
would support the findings of the court that the conduct of the
prosecutor in the assertions as set forth in paragraph 7 of her
affidavit are impermissible and that the error is not harmless
but in fact could have had a strong influence on the verdict
6

rendered by the jury where had the testimony of Hamilton been
given as it had been determined prior to the phone call the jury
may have very well concluded that the defendant had no intent to
steal services under the rental agreement but in fact had made
arrangements that the bill be paid and that the decision of the
witness Hamilton not to pay the rental bill but to pay what he
claimed defendant owed him was the reason the bill went unpaid.
The court will have this matter on its calendar on the
jU£

day of July, 1987, for scheduling a new trial.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this

fe.

day of July, 1987.
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